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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant developments in modern con-
stitutional thought revolves around judicial protection of fun-
damental privacy and liberty interests.' These interests are
derived from the first, eighth, and fourteenth amendments, the"penumbra" of privacy rights found generally in the Bill of
Rights,2 and the common law doctrine of informed consent.'
Courts have held these interests to be of such paramount con-
cern to individual freedom that states may not derogate these
interests unless a compelling state interest is at stake. The
judiciary's function is to balance the individual's liberty inter-
est against the state's interest in regulating or protecting per-
sons and to focus on the nexus between those two interests.
This Note will consider the process of protecting an indi-
vidual's constitutional right to refuse intrusive psychiatric
treatment-specifically, an involuntarily committed mental
1. "Fundamental" interests include certain non-economic interests valued so
highly by the courts that any state law burdening such a right is subject to the "strict
scrutiny" standard of judicial review. In contrast, a state law that burdens a non-
fundamental right is generally subject to deferential review by the courts. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
2. For a discussion of the various approaches to finding a constitutional right to
refuse psychiatric treatment, see Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive
Alternative Analysis and the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA.
L. REV. 375, 417-23 (1981); Comment, Civil Commitment: Guardianship, Substituted
Judgment, and Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 479, 481-91
(1984/85) [hereinafter Comment, Civil Commitment]; Comment, The Scope of the
Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment with
Psychotropic Drugs: An Analysis of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 28
VILL. L. REV. 101 (1982-83).
3. The doctrine of informed consent generally refers to the tort law theory that
requires a doctor to adequately inform his patient about the nature of some proposed
treatment and receive the patient's consent before performing the treatment. J.
LUDLAM, INFORMED CONSENT 19-23 (1978). If the doctor exceeds the scope of his
patient's consent or misrepresents the severity of the operation, the patient may bring
an action for battery against the doctor. Id. at 23-24. If the doctor fails to disclose
possible complications or alternative methods of treatment, the patient may bring an
action in negligence. Id. at 24. This doctrine raises serious concerns in the case where
a mental patient refuses to give, or is incapable of giving, informed consent to a doctor
to undergo electroconvulsive treatment (ECT).
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patient's right to refuse electroconvulsive "shock" treatment
(ECT). This issue illustrates the classic academic conflict
between personal freedom and state interests. The decision-
making process that is used to enforce or override the mental
patient's privacy rights will directly affect the interests of the
patients, their families, the mental health professionals
involved in administering ECT, the states, and the courts.
Each of these groups has an interest that conflicts to some
degree with the other interests.4
Analysis of this issue is particularly timely because the
Washington Supreme Court has recognized, for the first time
in In re Schuoler, the right to refuse ECT.5 Among other sig-
nificant themes, the existence of Schuoler may suggest a cur-
rent trend in psychiatric treatment toward a preference for the
use of ECT over alternative methods of treatment, such as
antipsychotic drugs.
This Note will first analyze and evaluate two competing
decision-making models established in other jurisdictions. The
Note will then apply that analysis to Schuoler and critically
evaluate that decision. The Note will conclude that while the
Washington court follows the more appropriate judicial substi-
tuted judgment model, its poor articulation of that model may
defeat the purpose of the decision: to protect a mental
patient's right to refuse ECT.
4. The patient has an interest in freedom from nonconsensual treatment and in
recovering or retaining mental health. The right to be free from nonconsensual
treatment is founded in the doctrine of informed consent, discussed supra note 3.
Aspects of this right may be seen in the decision-making system of the judicial
substituted judgment model, discussed infra text accompanying notes 40-74. The
patients' families have an interest in attaining the greatest welfare and care for their
loved ones. The mental health professionals perceive and arguably have a duty to
treat the patient in his "best interests," and the states have an interest, through their
police and parens patriae powers, in caring for persons who cannot take care of
themselves. Finally, the courts have an interest in executing legislative acts and in
regulating nonconsensual treatment that the mental health professionals deem to be in
the patients' best interests.
Between 1977 and 1980, the number of involuntary commitments per year in
Washington institutions rose from 325 to 1,129. The total number of voluntary and
involuntary commitments in Washington rose from less than 1,000 to over 1,500 per
year. Durham & La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of
Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395,
417 (1985) [hereinafter Empirical Consequences]. Interestingly, the increasing
incidence of Washington commitments was at least partly caused by a statutory
broadening of the definition of "gravely disabled." Id. at 417-428; see infra text
accompanying notes 121-24.
5. 106 Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986).
[Vol. 11:167
Right to Refuse Shock Treatment
II. BACKGROUND
Involuntary commitment is the process of confining a per-
son within the walls of a mental institution, whether publicly
or privately administered, against his will.6 When committing
an individual, the state has an interest in depriving the patient
of his liberty interest, for the benefit of others or the patient
himself, through either its police power or its parens patriae
power.7
A person is committed if he falls within one of several
statutorily defined categories of mental illness.' These catego-
ries generally require that the person is unable to take care of
himself or is a danger to himself or others. Once a patient is
committed, the state undertakes the patient's care, protection,
and treatment, if necessary. This treatment may include
administering psychotherapy, antipsychotic drugs, and possibly
ECT; in the past, it has included even psychosurgery.9
Courts have struggled over the past decade with determin-
ing the proper relationship among the judiciary, the mental
health professional (MHP), 10 and the patient when deciding
how to treat an involuntarily committed patient. The contro-
versy has centered on which of these three parties should have
the authority to determine whether a patient should receive
intrusive psychiatric treatment. 1 MHP's have taken the posi-
6. For a general discussion of the involuntary commitment process, see R. ROCK,
HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1968).
7. The state uses its police power to prevent a patient from harming himself or
others. The state uses its parens patriae power to provide a patient with his essential
daily needs. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (1987); Stromberg & Stone, A Model
State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 279-80
(1983), reprinted in American Psychiatric Association, Issues in Forensic Psychiatry
57-180 (1984).
8. See infra note 109.
9. See generally C. LINDZ, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK & L.
ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 179-83, 210-
13 (1984) [hereinafter INFORMED CONSENT]; P. SCHRAG, MIND CONTROL 148-86 (1978).
10. "Mental health professional" includes psychiatrists, psychologists, and
psychiatric nurses, and may include physicians, registered nurses, and social workers.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(11), (12) (1987). Although this term may be used
with reference to individuals who effectuate commitments of the mentally ill, for
purposes of this Note, MHP refers to those persons who treat patients who have
already been committed.
11. Antipsychotic drugs, ECT, and psychosurgery are examples of treatment
considered to be highly intrusive. "In essence, intrusiveness measures the extent to
which a treatment alters the behavior and thought processes of the patient." Note,
Regulation of Electroconvulsive Therapy, 75 MICH. L. REV. 363, 375 (1976).
Intrusiveness may also be thought of in terms of the degree and likelihood of adverse
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tion that they should have the authority to act in the patient's
best interests without any judicial intervention. 12 Conversely,
public interest and civil rights groups have taken the position
that the courts should regulate the administration of intrusive
treatment,13  giving particular deference to the patient's
expressed or implied preference.
Courts as well as MHP's have regarded ECT15 and anti-
psychotic drug therapy as two highly intrusive and potentially
dangerous procedures. 16 There is a great deal of controversy
over the efficacy and potential side effects of these treatment
methods. Many authorities find ECT to be a more extreme
method of treatment than antipsychotic drug therapy, 7 while
side effects caused by the treatment, such as memory loss and impairment of ability to
learn. See Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 506, 723 P.2d at 1107-08.
12. See infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the
International Psychiatric Association for the Advancement of Electrotherapy at 18-23;
Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103.
13. See infra notes 40-74 and accompanying text. See Brief of Amici Curiae The
Defender Association, Evergreen Legal Services, & American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington at 79-81, Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103.
14. The term "implied preference" here refers to the subjective method of
determining an incompetent person's intent under the substituted judgment model,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 55-60 and 91-97.
15. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 506, 723 P.2d at 1107. ECT is a very controversial
method of treating severe cases of mental illness. The use of ECT causes severe side
effects such as short- and long-term memory loss and impairment of the ability to
learn new material. Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ELECTROCONVULSIVE
THERAPY OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 57 (1978) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE ON ECT]).
ECT is administered by attaching electrodes to one or both temples and passing an
electric current through the brain for a split-second. The resulting convulsion, similar
to a grand mal seizure, lasts for less than a minute, and the patient regains
consciousness within half an hour. ECT has also been known to cause broken bones
and dislocations as well as respiratory and cardiovascular complications. Note,
Regulation of Electroconvulsive Therapy, 75 MICH. L. REV. 363, 365-67 (1976); see P.
SCHRAG, MIND CONTROL 151-60 (1978).
16. The term "antipsychotic drugs" refers to such drugs as Thorazine, Mellaril,
Prolixin, and Haldol, which are generally used in severe cases of schizophrenia and
depression. These drugs have been found to cause severe long-term side effects, such
as tardive dyskinesia, which causes involuntary muscle contractions. See Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359-60 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part, 634
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293, n.1 (1982); P. SCHRAG, MIND
CONTROL 106-11 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (McDonald,
J., concurring) ("I can envision no greater insult to the person as a whole than the
involuntary administration of ECT when the patient is neither suicidal nor dangerous
to others."). State statutes generally tend to provide greater protections against
improper treatment with ECT than with antipsychotic drugs. The Washington
Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA), for example, prevents psychiatrists from treating
patients with ECT without a court order but does not provide any such protection
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others find ECT to be more effective than drugs with some
types of psychological disorders, and especially in cases of
severe depression.18 However, states generally view ECT as a
more intrusive method of treatment than drugs. 9
While few courts have directly confronted the issue of the
right to refuse ECT,2° some states have established substantive
and procedural requirements for protecting the right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs. The following analysis will apply two
decision-making models, developed for antipsychotic drug
treatment, to the case of ECT. This application should reveal
the proper groundwork for analyzing how the administration
of ECT should be regulated.
from treatment with antipsychotic drugs. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370 (1987).
ECT is often used as a last resort treatment for patients who do not respond to
treatment with antipsychotic drugs; such was the case with Ms. Schuoler. See infra
text accompanying notes 70-82.
18. TASK FORCE ON ECT, supra note 15, at 14-16 ("ECT was shown to be a
superior antidepressant treatment for depressed patients diagnosed as manic-
depressive and involutionally psychotic."); Note, Regulation of Electroconvulsive
Therapy, supra note 11, at 366.
19. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370 (1987), which provides an absolute right
to refuse psychosurgery and a qualified right to refuse ECT but does not provide a
right to refuse antipsychotic drugs with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2d (1), (2) (West
1981), which provides an absolute right to refuse shock treatment and psychosurgery,
but only requires a physician's written order for medication. Also compare with MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West Supp. 1987), which provides mental patients with
the right to refuse shock treatment and lobotomy but authorizes the hospital
superintendent to deny these rights for good cause, and further provides that such
treatment shall not be performed without the written consent of the patient's legal
guardian or his nearest living relative.
20. See Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1976) (judicially authorized
administration of ECT must be necessary and reasonable as well as the least intrusive
method, as determined by various factors); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d at 731-32 (in
the absence of a judicial declaration of incompetence, or emergency posing an
immediate danger of harm to others or to the patient, the patient may not be
compelled to undergo ECT against his will, simply because it was considered in his
best interest); Conservatorship of Waltz, 180 Cal. App. 3d 722, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1986);
Northern Cal. Psychiatric Soc'y v. Berkeley, 178 Cal. App. 3d 90, 223 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1986); Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976); In re W. S., Jr.,
152 N.J. Super. 298, 377 A.2d 969 (1977).
Other courts have treated ECT and antipsychotic drugs identically. See, e.g., In re
Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 436-37, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53 (1981), where the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts treated drugs in the same manner as it
would treat psychosurgery or ECT "[b]ecause of both the profound effect that these
drugs have on the thought processes of an individual and the well-established
likelihood of severe and irreversible adverse side effects .. "
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III. TWO MODELS FOR REGULATING TREATMENT REFUSAL:
MEDICAL SECOND OPINION AND JUDICIAL
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT
Two states have established doctrines that deal with the
issue of regulating intrusive treatment. New Jersey adopted
the medical second opinion model as a means of regulating the
administration of antipsychotic drugs to involuntarily commit-
ted mental patients.21 Massachusetts adopted the judicial sub-
stituted judgment model to protect involuntary mental
patients from unwanted drug treatment.22 These two models
vary in their methods of reviewing an involuntarily committed
mental patient's refusal of antipsychotic drugs.
A. The Medical Second Opinion Model
New Jersey's medical model provides that an MHP has the
authority to decide whether to treat the patient with anti-
psychotic drugs.23 The MHP's decision is reviewed through
hospital administrative regulations, rather than through the
courts.24 The standard for measuring the patient's constitu-
tional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs is "whether the
patient constitutes a danger to himself or others. '25 This stan-
dard appears to establish the threshold requirement for finding
that a compelling state interest exists to override the patient's
right to refuse intrusive psychiatric treatment.
Reviewing New Jersey's model, a federal court of appeals
held in Rennie v. Klein 26 that involuntarily committed mental
patients have a constitutional right to refuse administration of
antipsychotic drugs. That right may be overridden, however, if
the patient's doctor determines that the patient 1) will harm
himself or others without the drugs; 2) cannot improve without
the drugs; or 3) can improve without the drugs, but only at a
significantly lower rate. The physician who makes the deci-
sion to administer such drugs must exercise professional
21. See infra text accompanying notes 23-36.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 40-69.
23. See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983). On previous hearing, the
court noted that no New Jersey appellate courts have reviewed this issue. Rennie v.
Klein, 853 F.2d 836, 842 (3d Cir. 1981). Therefore, all discussion of New Jersey's
medical model will be through reference to federal court decisions.
24. See, Rennie, 720 F.2d at 270 n.9 (quoting N.J. Ad. Bull. 78-3 (1975)).
25. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269.
26. 720 F.2d 266.
27. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 274 (quoting N.J. Ad. Bull. 78-3, § 11(B) (1975)).
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judgment.28
The Rennie court also determined that under New
Jersey's model, MHP's need not select for the patient the
"'least intrusive treatment' available under the circum-
stances. '29 Although one factor MHP's must consider is the
possibility and extent of harmful side effects,3 ° MHP's may
constitutionally administer antipsychotic drugs to a patient
whenever in their professional judgment they deem such an
action "necessary to prevent the patient from endangering
himself or others."3 The omission of the "least intrusive"
requirement from constitutional scrutiny is significant in that
MHP's may apply the treatment they think is in the patient's
best interests, regardless of how the patient views the relative
intrusiveness of the treatment.
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Youngberg v.
Romeo,32 the Rennie court held that an MHP's judgment on
the dangerousness of a patient and the MHP's decision to
administer medication will be presumed valid unless shown to
be a "substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment, practice or standards. '33 The Youngberg court justified
this presumption of validity because "there certainly is no rea-
son to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropri-
ate professionals in making [treatment] decisions. '34
An additional rationale for the medical model, found in
Parham v. J.R.,3 is that "[t]he judicial model for factfinding
for all constitutionally protected interests, regardless of their
nature, can turn rational decision-making into an unmanage-
able enterprise. '36 Presumably, the court was referring to the
possibility that an incompetent patient might be deprived of
necessary treatment if the treating doctor's petition for author-
ization were to be tied up in the courts. Proponents of the
medical model argue that it avoids congestion in the courts and
28. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269.
29. Id. at 269 n.9.
30. Id. at 269.
31. Id
32. 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
33. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269.
34. 457 U.S. at 322-23. Further, the Youngberg court relied on Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 544 (1979), which held that courts should not "second-guess the expert
administrators on matters on which they are better informed ......
35. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
36. Id. at 608, n.16.
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allows MHP's to make more effective, educated decisions for
patients.
However, the medical model has been criticized over the
past decade as a dangerous method of decision-making. Critics
note that the level of deference provided to MHP's through the
medical model creates opportunities for unlimited application
and abuse.17  By elevating the importance of improving the
patient's condition, MHP's diminish the importance of protect-
ing the patient's privacy and liberty interests.38 Further, the
science of psychiatry itself is inexact and very controversial;
different schools of thought often conflict directly on methods
of treatment. Because some psychiatrists tend to follow exclu-
sively one method of treatment for certain types of patients,
one should not defer to their recommendations without suffi-
cient scrutiny.39 One solution to the shortcomings of the medi-
cal model is the regulation of treatment decisions through the
judicial model.
B. The Judicial Substituted Judgment Model
The Massachusetts judicial substituted judgment model
provides extensive safeguards for protecting the fourteenth
amendment or "penumbral" privacy rights of mental patients.
This system limits the authority of MHP's in making treat-
ment decisions for their patients by assuming that patients
have the right to personally exercise treatment decisions until
a court deems them incompetent.40  However, a doctor may
override a patient's desires if an emergency situation requires
37. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1123 (D. Haw. 1976) ("Given the
present state of medical knowledge regarding abnormal behavior and its treatment,
few things would be more fraught with peril than to irrevocably condition a State's
power to protect the mentally ill upon the providing of such treatment as will give
(them) a realistic opportunity to be cured"); Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 437
n.11, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53 n.11 (1981) ("The obvious potential for misuse of [antipsychotic]
drugs provides an additional reason to require judicial approval prior to [their] forcible
use . . . upon incompetent individuals."); Empirical Consequences, supra note 4, at 397
(there has been an historical shift from the medical model to the judicial model);
Ennis, Judicial Involvement in the Public Practice of Psychiatry, in LAW AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 5-17 (1978); Comment, Civil Commitment, supra note 2,
at 501-03.
38. D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 30-32 (Perspectives in Law
& Psychology No. 4, 1981).
39. See id. at 32. Deference to other doctors' recommendations without
independent investigation is better known as "rubber-stamping."
40. Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 497, 458
N.E.2d 308, 314-16 (1983) (citing Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 434-35, 421 N.E.2d
at 51-52 (1981)).
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that the patient receive treatment.41
Once the patient is found incompetent, the court must
enter a substituted judgment stating whether the patient
would accept or refuse treatment if he were competent.42 This
judgment relies on a number of factors regarding the patient's
character and circumstances. 43  Further, an emergency or an
extreme case of physical deterioration are the only situations
sufficiently compelling to allow doctors to administer anti-
psychotic drugs to incompetent patients without prior court
approval.44 Given these substantive and procedural require-
ments, mental patients are well-protected from the dangers
encountered when MHP's have virtually unlimited authority.
In Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health,45
seven mental patients brought a class action, representing all
patients voluntarily and involuntarily committed to two units
of Boston State Hospital. The representatives challenged the
hospital's seclusion and medication of patients against their
will. The court in Rogers extended the reasoning of its earlier
decision in In re Guardianship of Roe,46 which held that nonin-
stitutionalized mental patients have the right to refuse anti-
psychotic drugs.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed its"preference for judicial resolution of certain legal issues aris-
ing from proposed extraordinary medical treatment."47 The
court recognized that protection of constitutional interests by
use of the judicial model can render the process unmanage-
41. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has accepted the dictionary
definition of "emergency": "'an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the
resulting state that calls for immediate action'." Rogers, 390 Mass. at 509 n.25, 458
N.E.2d at 321 n.25 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 741 (1961)).
Massachusetts statutory law provides:
In addition to [various enumerated rights] and any other rights
guaranteed by law, a mentally ill person in the care of the department shall
have the following legal and civil rights: ... to refuse shock treatment, to
refuse lobotomy, and any other rights specified in the regulations of the
department; provided, however, that any of these rights may be denied for
good cause by the superintendent or his designee and a statement of the
reasons for any such denial entered in the treatment record of such person.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
42. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 500, 458 N.E.2d at 316.
43. Id. at 503, 458 N.E.2d at 317 (quoting Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 435-36,
421 N.E.2d at 52).
44. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510-11, 458 N.E.2d at 321-22.
45. 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
46. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
47. Id. at 434, 421 N.E.2d at 51.
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able.4" However, it also found that the issue concerning a
patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs requires "the pro-
cess of detached but passionate investigation and deci-
sion ... , Contrary to the ideals of the medical model, the
issue concerning a patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs
is "only incidentally a medical question."50
The court in Rogers noted that both common law and stat-
utory law presume that a person is competent to manage his
affairs. This presumption is rebutted only when a court finds
him incapable of taking care of himself by reason of mental ill-
ness (incompetent), regardless of whether he has been commit-
ted.5 ' The purpose of commitment is to protect the patient or
others from physical harm. That a person is committed does
not imply an inability to make treatment decisions.52 Thus, a
patient retains the unfettered right to refuse intrusive treat-
ment until a court finds him to be incompetent.
The Rogers court pointed out that a patient "must be
found incompetent before a judge may make a substituted
judgment decision. '5 3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court had previously rejected the proposition that doctors
should be allowed to make substituted judgment decisions; a
substituted judgment does not require medical expertise.
Rather, the court should consider medical advice and opinion
to the extent that the patient would use them if he were
competent 4
The court stressed in Rogers that the substituted judgment
decision should reflect what the patient would decide, not what
the doctor finds to be in the patient's best interests.5 5 "Even if
the patient's choice will not achieve the restoration of the
patient's health, or will result in longer hospitalization, that
choice must be respected. The patient has the right to be
wrong in the choice of treatment." 6
The substituted judgment model in Massachusetts entails
a detailed consideration of multiple factors to ensure accuracy
48. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979).
49. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 434, 421 N.E.2d at 51.
50. Id.
51. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 313. See the implied statutory
definition of incompetency, infra note 61.
52. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 496, 458 N.E.2d at 313.
53. Id. at 499, 458 N.E.2d at 315.
54. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 435, 421 N.E.2d at 52.
55. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 500, 458 N.E.2d at 316.
56. Id. at 501 n.15, 458 N.E.2d at 316 n.15.
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and consistency in court proceedings.57 The court should con-
sider: 1) a previously competent patient's expressed prefer-
ences regarding treatment, which should be treated as a
critical factor, but even a patient's statements made while
incompetent should be considered; 2) the patient's religious
beliefs; 3) the emotional and financial impact of treatment or
non-treatment on the patient's family; 4) the probability of
adverse side effects of the treatment; 5) the consequences if
treatment is refused; and 6) the prognosis with treatment.5 8
Although a judge should consider each of these factors, this list
is by no means exhaustive.5 9 Again, the object of the substi-
tuted judgment is to give the fullest possible expression to the
character and circumstances of the patient. °
Next, if the court finds through a substituted judgment
that the patient would accept the proposed treatment, the
judge may order such treatment for the patient. 1 If the court
finds that the patient would refuse treatment, the MHP's may
administer treatment under the police power or the parens
patriae power, 2 but only if there exists a compelling state
interest that will override that refusal.6 3
The court in Guardianship of Roe rejected as insuffi-
ciently compelling a state interest in helping citizens function
at their maximum level of capacity.' The court held that
although the state may occasionally "have a generalized parens
57. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 444, 421 N.E.2d at 56-59.
58. Id., followed in Rogers, 390 Mass. at 505-06, 458 N.E.2d at 318-19.
59. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 444, 421 N.E.2d at 57.
60. Id. at 444, 421 N.E.2d at 56 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977)).
61. The statutory procedure is as follows:
After a hearing on the petition regarding antipsychotic medication
treatment the court shall not authorize medical treatment unless it (i)
specifically finds that the person is incapable of making informed decisions
concerning the proposed medical treatment, (ii) upon application of the legal
substituted judgment standard, specifically finds that the patient would accept
such treatment if competent, and (iii) specifically approves and authorizes a
written substituted judgment treatment plan....
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 8B(d) (West Supp. 1987).
62. See supra note 7.
63. Massachusetts has recognized four state interests generally recognized as
sufficiently compelling to override a patient's right to refuse medical treatment. The
interests are: 1) the preservation of life; 2) the protection of the interests of innocent
third parties; 3) the prevention of suicide; and 4) maintaining the ethical integrity of
the medical profession. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 448, 421 N.E.2d at 59
(quoting Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425). These interests have also
been recognized in Washington; see infra text accompanying note 115.
64. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 449, 421 N.E.2d at 59.
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patriae interest in removing obstacles to individual develop-
ment, this general interest does not outweigh the fundamental
individual rights here asserted."65 However, the court would
allow the state to administer antipsychotic drugs to noncon-
senting patients under the state's parens patriae power to pre-
vent the "immediate, substantial, and irreversible deterioration
of a serious mental illness," in cases in which even a small
avoidable delay would be unacceptable.66 Absent an emer-
gency situation, the court held that no state interest is suffi-
ciently compelling to overcome a patient's refusal of
antipsychotic drugs.67
In addition, the Guardianship of Roe court held that the
Commonwealth may administer antipsychotic drugs under its
police power without prior court approval only if a patient
poses an imminent threat of harm to himself or others and if
there is no less intrusive alternative to antipsychotic drugs:8
"No other State interest is sufficiently compelling to warrant
the extremely intrusive measures necessary for forcible medi-
cation with antipsychotic drugs. '69 Thus, Massachusetts holds
a relatively high threshold interest for the justification of forci-
ble medical treatment.
Although the judicial model has been criticized by psychia-
trists as a device to frustrate their efforts in treating patients
with mental disorders, the model provides scrutinizing protec-
tion of individuals' privacy or liberty interests.7 ° The judicial
model embraces the common law doctrine of informed con-
sent,71 which deters doctors from treating patients without
first receiving consent from a patient who has received ade-
quate information to make an informed decision.
The soundness of this model rests on the assurance that
MHP's will not be able to impose highly intrusive treatments
on persons who do not want such treatments, except in the
case of an emergency. The psychiatrist's relationship to the
patient should be advisory rather than paternal.72 Provided
65. Id.
66. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511, 458 N.E.2d at 322 (quoting Guardianship of Roe, 383
Mass. at 440, 458 N.E.2d at 55).
67. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511, 458 N.E.2d at 322.
68. Id. at 511, 458 N.E.2d at 321-22.
69. Id. at 511, 458 N.E.2d at 322.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
71. See supra note 3.
72. See Cole, Patients' Rights vs. Doctors' Rights: Which Should Take
Precedence?, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS-VALUES IN
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the judicial model contains adequate legal definitions and tests
for judges to follow, the regulation of ECT through the courts
should decrease the likelihood of a rubber-stamp review of
MHPs' treatment recommendations.
The necessity for sufficient definitions of terms in the judi-
cial model should become clear in the following analysis of In
re Schuoler,73 a recent Washington case involving a patient's
right to refuse ECT. Although the models as detailed above
apply to the administration of antipsychotic drugs, with some




The facts in Schuoler are a prime example of how judges
may unduly defer to the authority of MHP's. On August 11,
1984, Loretta Schuoler was admitted to the Yakima Valley
Memorial Hospital because of mental illness for the fourth
time since March, 1983.71 Ms. Schuoler was non-communica-
tive and appeared to be severely depressed. Five days later,
she was involuntarily committed for a 14-day evaluation and
treatment period.76 The following day, a judge pro tempore
authorized Ms. Schuoler's treating psychiatrist to administer
ECT, without her consent, as a method of treating her depres-
77sion. Ms. Schuoler subsequently appealed her case, even
CONFLICT 56-73 (1982). Of course, there is a school of thought which asserts that a
paternal position is the better approach to treating mentally ill or incompetent
patients. See TASK FORCE ON ECT, supra note 15 at 141.
73. 106 Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986).
74. It is noted that a straight comparison of the different methods of regulating
ECT in Washington, New Jersey, and Massachusetts would require a different analysis
from that proposed in this Note. Each state has a different method of protecting
patients from unwanted ECT. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. Rather,
this article compares Washington's model for regulating ECT to New Jersey's and
Massachusetts' models for regulating antipsychotic drugs not only because the two
types of treatment are considered highly intrusive but also because in the abstract,
these models are representative of the two competing schools of thought regarding the
proper relationship between courts, patients, and doctors.
75. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 502, 723 P.2d at 1105.
76. Id. at 503, 723 P.2d at 1105.
77. Id. at 502-03, 723 P.2d at 1105-06 ("As a practical matter, a court probably can
find a compelling state interest to treat an involuntarily committed person with ECT
relatively often.")
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though she could not be provided with effective relief."8 The
Washington Supreme Court reviewed the process of authoriz-
ing the nonconsensual administration of ECT because of the
substantial public interest.
79
The court in Schuoler provided substantive and procedural
guidelines for Washington courts to follow when considering
whether to authorize the administration of ECT on a noncon-
senting involuntarily committed mental patient. The court
purported to adhere to the judicial model by providing involun-
tarily committed mental patients with substantial protection
through the courts, pursuant to the Involuntary Treatment Act
(ITA). s° The court followed previous Washington cases which
held that an incompetent person or his guardian has the right
to choose one medical treatment over another8 1 and to refuse
treatment such as life support systems.8 2 These pre-Schuoler
cases as well as the applicable section under the ITA evince
Washington's preference for judicial regulation of critical med-
ical decisions.
78. Id. at 503, 723 P.2d at 1106. Since she had already been subjected to shock
treatment, the issue regarding her own case was moot.
79. Id. at 504-06, 723 P.2d at 1106-07.
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05 (1987). Section 71.05.370 of the ITA provides:
Insofar as danger to the individual or others is not created, each person
involuntarily detained . . . or committed for treatment and evaluation
pursuant to this chapter shall have.., the following rights:
(7) Not to consent to the performance of shock treatment or surgery,
except emergency life-saving surgery, upon him, and not to have shock
treatment or nonemergency surgery in such circumstance unless ordered by a
court pursuant to a judicial hearing in which the person is present and
represented by counsel, and the court shall appoint a [mental health
professional] designated by such person or his counsel to testify on behalf of
such person;
(9) Not to have psychosurgery performed on him under any
circumstances.
Note that the statute provides an exception for surgery in emergency life-saving
situations, but not for shock treatment. However, the phrase "in such circumstance"
appears to refer to an emergency situation, and the refusal of shock treatment is
included in this situation. Thus the statute could be read to require an emergency life-
saving situation before a court can order ECT. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 115-
21 (possible compelling state interests may require less than an emergency situation).
81. In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984) (incompetent expressed a
preference for radiation treatment over surgical removal of her cancerous larynx).
82. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (husband of woman in
chronic vegetative state sought to discontinue life support systems); In re Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (hospital sought removal of life support systems
from brain-dead patient who had been severely mentally retarded since birth and had
no family).
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The Schuoler court developed a two-part test. The first
part is a threshold test to determine whether a substituted
judgment should be made. Recognizing the highly intrusive
nature of ECT, the court acknowledged that involuntarily com-
mitted mental patients retain a fundamental liberty interest in
refusing ECT.83 If a patient "appears unable to understand
fully the nature of the ECT hearing-as severely mentally ill
patients often are-the court should make a substituted judg-
ment for the patient."84 However, no guardian appointment or
determination of competency is necessary for such a judgment
to be made. 5
The second part of the test is a due process inquiry: denial
of a patient's right to refuse ECT must meet constitutional due
process requirements. The desires of the patient may be over-
ridden only if 1) there exists a compelling state interest 86 and
2) administering ECT is both necessary and effective to further
that state interest.8 7
B. Summary of Critique
MHP's have an interest in treating mentally ill patients as
quickly and efficiently as possible. 8 The Schuoler court was
reluctant to create a rule that would frustrate the efforts of
MHP's to effectuate that goal. On the other hand, the legisla-
ture and the court have established a policy in favor of judicial
regulation of MHPs' professional decisions, at least with regard
to intrusive treatment.8 9 Apparently, the Schuoler court rea-
soned that it was compelled to reach a compromise between
these competing policies that would appease both MHP's and
advocates of patients' rights. Yet this compromise may yield
unfortunate results.
83. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 507, 723 P.2d at 1108.
84. Id.
85. Id at 506, 723 P.2d at 1107.
86. Id at 508 n.4, 723 P.2d at 1109 n.4.
87. Id. at 509, 723 P.2d at 1109. The court also agreed with Ms. Schuoler that "the
State should have to prove each element justifying the authorization of ECT ... with
'clear, cogent, and convincing' evidence." Id. at 510, 723 P.2d at 1110.
88. Id. at 513, 723 P.2d at 1111.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010 (1987) establishes the legislative intent behind
the ITA: "(1) To end inappropriate, indefinite commitment of mentally disordered
persons and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from such commitment; (2) To
provide prompt evaluation and short term treatment of persons with serious mental
disorders." Whether the statute effectuates this intent is another matter. See
generally Empirical Consequences, supra note 4. See supra text accompanying notes
80-83.
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The Washington Supreme Court established a dangerous
version of the judicial model. The court provided an indefinite
basis for determining how to make a substituted judgment. It
also provided an inadequate threshold test for determining
when to make a substituted judgment. In addition, the court
created a defective due process inquiry which fails to properly
outline the situations that will give rise to a compelling state
interest. The court's opinion implicitly gives judges discretion
in deciding what state interests are sufficiently compelling, and
it makes a curious assumption regarding commitments based
on grave disability.
These shortcomings will encourage the courts to defer
unduly to the authority of mental health professionals when
deciding when to make substituted judgments, whether the
patients would accept or refuse treatment if competent, and
whether a compelling state interest justifies the administration
of ECT to patients who refuse ECT. The court's decision also
leaves room for improper application of the substituted judg-
ment model and the development of insufficiently compelling
state interests. While the decision in Schuoler tends to follow
the judicial model, the decision actually allows for many of the
same problems found in the medical model.9 ° The potential
exists for patients' liberty interests to be subordinated to doc-
tors' interests in treating the patients, whose rights to due pro-
cess may thus be jeopardized.
C. Factors for Consideration in Making a
Substituted Judgment
The Schuoler court has not provided a definitive array of
factors to be considered when making a substituted judgment
for an incompetent patient. The court recommended that
judges consider three factors: "previous and current state-
ments of the patient, religious and moral values of the patient
regarding medical treatment and [ECT], and views of individu-
als that might influence the patient's decision."91 The court
then referred to In re Ingram92 for an analogous standard used
in making medical treatment decisions for incompetent
persons.
The court in Ingram held that a judicial finding of incom-
90. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
91. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 507, 723 P.2d at 1108.
92. 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363.
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petency does not deprive a patient of her right to refuse
amputative surgery.93 Rather, a judge is to make a substituted
judgment for the patient to determine what that patient would
do if she were competent to make the decision.94 The Ingram
court stated:
The goal is not to do what most people would do, or
what the court believes is the wise thing to do, but rather
what this particular individual would do if she were compe-
tent and understood all the circumstances, including her
present and future competency....
With this goal in mind, the court should consider all rel-
evant factors that would influence this person's decisions
regarding medical treatment. These would include the
ward's prognosis if she chose no treatment; the ward's prog-
nosis if she chose one treatment over another; the risk of
adverse side effects from the proposed treatments; the intru-
siveness or severity of the proposed treatments; the ability of
the ward to cooperate and assist with post-treatment ther-
apy; the ward's religious or moral views regarding medical
care or the dying process; and the wishes of family and
friends, if those wishes would influence the ward's decision.
The court may also consider what most people would do in
similar circumstances, but.., this should not be regarded as
controlling....
Finally, the ward's expressed wishes must be given
substantial weight, even if made while the ward is
incompetent.95
It is unclear whether the Schuoler court intended a judge
to consider all these factors when making a substituted judg-
ment regarding ECT for a mental patient or whether the court
only intended a judge to consider the few factors expressly
listed in Schuoler. The Schuoler court may have provided a
few examples of what factors a judge should consider, under
the standard set forth in Ingram, while inadvertently omitting
the other factors. If the Schuoler opinion is interpreted to
93. Id. at 836, 689 P.2d at 1368. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.040(3) (1987) prevents an
incompetent's guardian from consenting to therapy that induces convulsions (such as
ECT), psychosurgery, amputation, and any other mental health procedures that are
intrusive on the person's bodily integrity or are protected under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.370 (1987), without a court order.
94. Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 838-39, 689 P.2d at 1369-70.
95. Id. at 839-40, 689 P.2d at 1364-70. See also Note, The Substituted Judgment
Doctrine Expands Beyond Life-Prolonging Decisions, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 581-
84 (1983).
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require the comprehensive analysis required in Ingram, the
substituted judgment inquiry in ECT hearings should provide
as thorough a survey of the patient's preference as the Massa-
chusetts doctrine provides for antipsychotic drug hearings. 9
Therefore, a judge would likely give full effect to the desires of
the patient.
On the other hand, if Schuoler is interpreted to include a
consideration of only the factors expressly listed in that opin-
ion, the substituted judgment analysis would be incomplete.
Given only the guidance of those factors articulated in
Schuoler, judges would fail to take into consideration factors
highly relevant to any patient's decision, such as the patient's
prognosis with and without treatment, the risk of adverse side
effects, the intrusiveness of ECT, and the patient's ability to
cooperate with doctors after treatment.97 If the judge does not
fully consider the patient's position, he may well rely more
heavily on the opinion of the MHP and ultimately determine
what the patient should decide, rather than what the patient
would decide.
Thus, the court has provided an unclear and perhaps inad-
equate articulation of the standard of inquiry involved in an
ECT substituted judgment decision. This uncertainty may in
turn cause the courts to rubber-stamp the MHPs' recommen-
dations, thereby undermining the court's role in protecting
individuals' rights. The logical interpretation of the Schuoler
court's opinion would include a consideration of all factors rel-
evant to a patient's decision. Even more alarming than the
dangers involved with the uncertainty of the Schuoler court's
96. See supra text accompanying notes 57-63. Curiously, the Schuoler court held
that judges should consider the patient's medical prognosis with and without
treatment in relation to a completely different category of analysis. According to
Schuoler, judges should consider this factor when deciding whether ECT will be
necessary and effective to further a compelling state interest, i.e., the least restrictive
alternative, rather than when making a substituted judgment for the patient. 106
Wash. 2d at 509, 723 P.2d at 1109. Consideration of this factor may be helpful in
determining the necessity or prospective effectiveness of ECT in an individual case.
97. Consideration of these additional factors would be only helpful to a judge
whose duty is to determine as precisely as possible the patient's desires. For example,
if a stubborn patient would rebel and refuse to cooperate with MHP's after undergoing
shock treatment, such treatment might not serve any useful purpose. For a
description of the typical doctor-patient relationship in mental hospitals, see INFORMED
CONSENT, supra note 9, at 179-83, 210-13. While the authors describe the decision-
making process in ECT cases as "mutual," they note that patients who initially refused
ECT often accepted the treatment after persistence on the part of their doctors. It is
all too possible that mental patients may become too dependent on their doctors and
that doctors may thus become too influential on their patients.
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substituted judgment standard, however, are those dangers
involved in the court's test for deciding when such a judgment
should be entered.
D. Determining When to Make Substituted Judgments
As the Massachusetts doctrine dictates, competency deter-
minations are an integral element of substituted judgment pro-
ceedings. A substituted judgment should be made only when
the patient is incompetent to make a treatment decision."
Nevertheless, the Schuoler court refused to incorporate compe-
tency hearings and guardian appointments under the guardian-
ship statutes99 with ECT hearings under the ITA.'00 The court
reasoned that the legislature intended the two statutes to work
independently of each other, rather than in conjunction with
each other. 10 In addition, the court reasoned that the appoint-
ment of a guardian would be futile because the guardianship
statute expressly prohibits guardians from consenting to ECT
for their wards.' °2 Further, the time consuming process
involved in a competency hearing and guardian appointment
could frustrate the purpose of the involuntary commitment
statute. 0 3 Thus, the court was faced with the problem of
bypassing competency hearings yet somehow determining a
patient's competency to refuse ECT.
The court's solution to this dilemma was to allow a judge
to make a substituted judgment if the patient cannot fully
understand the nature of the ECT hearing. 0 4 The court appar-
ently perceived a patient's inability to fully understand ECT
98. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
99. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.88, 11.92 (1987).
100. 106 Wash. 2d at 504-05, 723 P.2d at 1106-07; WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370(7)
(1987).
101. The court stated that the purpose of the guardianship statutes is to provide a
system where one person makes decisions for another who is not legally competent to
make decisions. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 504, 723 P.2d at 1106. On the other hand,
according to the court, the ITA provides for the needs of persons who are a danger to
others or themselves, or who are gravely disabled; these persons may be competent or
incompetent. Id. Although the court may have accurately interpreted the intended
purposes of these statutes, problems with the court's decision may arise when a person
committed under the ITA is incompetent but has not yet had a competency
determination. This was the case with Ms. Schuoler. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-5,
Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103. The accompanying discussion in the text is
most pertinent to this type of situation.
102. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 505, 723 P.2d at 1107.
103. Id. at 505-06, 723 P.2d at 1107. See supra note 96.
104. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 507, 723 P.2d at 1108.
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hearings to be the equivalent of his incapacity to make a medi-
cal treatment decision. However, the court's perception is
erroneous because persons capable of making informed medi-
cal decisions might not fully understand the nature of ECT
hearings.
The Schuoler court's inquiry into whether the patient fully
understands the nature of the ECT hearing does not satisfy the
need for a bona fide competency finding."0 5 An alternative
would be to require, before entering a substituted judgment, a
competency determination that inquires whether the patient is
incapable by reason of mental illness of making an informed
medical decision. This route would be far less offensive to the
line of precedent in this State10 6 and would assure that substi-
tuted judgments are made only for truly "incompetent"
patients.
Determining when to make substituted judgments must be
viewed in light of the statutory criteria for involuntary com-
mitments. 0 7 Subsequent to the Schuoler decision, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court acknowledged a correlation between the
grave disability standard of commitment and a person's ability
to make a treatment decision. In In re LaBelle,10 8 the court
105. The court's application of this test appears to be at variance with its
statement of the rule. Rather than observing whether Ms. Schuoler fully understood
the nature of the ECT hearing, the court noted that both of her doctors testified that
discussing ECT itself with her was futile and concluded that a substituted judgment
should have been made. 106 Wash. 2d at 507, 723 P.2d at 1108.
106. The court's purported competency test allows for an unprecedented extension
of the substituted judgment doctrine beyond its accepted use in Washington. Prior to
Schuoler, the substituted judgment model had been applied only in cases where the
patient already had been deemed legally incompetent. Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 830,
689 P.2d at 1374; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738. See also Gundy v. Pauley, 619
S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (an involuntarily committed patient cannot be
compelled to undergo ECT against his will simply because it is considered to be in his
best interests, without a judicial determination of incompetence or the existence of an
emergency that poses an immediate danger of harm to himself or others); Rogers, 390
Mass. at 490, 458 N.E.2d at 314-15 ("a distinct adjudication of incapacity to make
treatment decisions (incomptence) must precede any determination to override
patient's rights to make their own treatment decisions."). A person in Washington is
"incompetent" under the guardianship statute, by reason of mental illness or
otherwise, if he is incapable "of either managing his property or caring for himself or
both." WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.010(1)(b)(1987). Extending the application of the
substituted judgment doctrine in Washington to cases where the patient has not been
formally adjudged incompetent might be justified, but only if a bona fide competency
finding is made. Cf. Comment, Civil Commitment, supra note 2 at 495-99 (analyzing
the importance of legal competency when determining whether there is a right to
refuse medical treatment).
107. See infra note 109.
108. 107 Wash. 2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
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construed the "cognitive or volitional control"'0 9 definition of
grave disability to implicitly require "that the individual is
unable, because of severe deterioration of mental functioning,
to make a rational decision with respect to his need for treat-
ment."'1 0 The court explained its construction of the definition
as follows:
This requirement is necessary to ensure that a causal
nexus exists between proof of "severe deterioration in rou-
tine functioning" and proof that the person so affected "is
not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or
safety". So construed, RCW 71.05.020(1)(b) is neither uncon-
stitutionally vague nor overbroad."'
The LaBelle court's holding may help simplify the problem
in Schuoler of deciding when to make a substituted judgment
for a patient not deemed incompetent, but only to the extent
that the patient has been committed under the "cognitive or
volitional control" definition of grave disability. The implicit
requirement that a person committed under this category is
unable to make a rational treatment decision should allow a
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.240 (1987) provides in part:
At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that such person, as the result of mental
disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm to others or himself, or is
gravely disabled, and, after considering less restrictive alternatives to
involuntary detention and treatment, finds that no such alternatives are in
the best interests of such person or others, the court shall order that such
person be detained for involuntary treatment not to exceed fourteen days in a
facility certified to provide treatment by the department of social and health
services.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020 (1987) provides in part:
(1) "Gravely disabled" means a condition in which a person, as a result
of a mental disorder: (a) is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from
a failure to provide for his essential human needs of health or safety, or (b)
manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated
and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and
is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety;
(3) "Likelihood of serious harm" means either: (a) a substantial risk
that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his own person, as
evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on
one's self, (b) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an indi-
vidual upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or
which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such
harm, or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an indi-
vidual upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused
substantial loss or damage to the property of others....
110. 107 Wash. 2d at 208, 728 P.2d at 146.
Ill. Id
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court holding an ECT hearing to make a substituted judgment
for the patient. However, the problem of determining when a
patient is incompetent still exists for patients who are commit-
ted not under the "cognitive or volitional control" category, but
rather under "the dangerousness to self or others" category.
112
E. Grave Disability and Compelling State Interests
The Schuoler court continued its discussion with an analy-
sis of the State's power to administer ECT against a patient's
will. Relying on Roe v. Wade,"3 the court held that a judge
may order the administration of ECT "upon a nonconsenting
involuntarily committed patient when the petitioning party
proves 1) a compelling state interest to administer ECT, and 2)
ECT is both necessary and effective for furthering that
interest.""' 4
Washington has acknowledged four commonly noted inter-
ests sufficiently compelling to justify disregarding a patient's
refusal of medical treatment. Those interests are: "(1) the
preservation of life; (2) the protection of interests of innocent
third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) mainte-
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.""'
The Schuoler court's opinion may be interpreted to require
judges to consider only whether there exists a state interest as
compelling as the ones listed. Under this standard, judges
could decide for themselves whether other state interests such
as assuring the health of the patient are sufficiently compelling
to order ECT against a patient's wishes.11 In contrast, under
112. A person may be involuntarily committed in Washington under two
alternative categories. Petitions for commitment may be filed when a person is either
"gravely disabled" or "presents a likelihood of serious harm to others or himself .. "
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(1)(b) (1987). The state's parens patriae power
presumably invokes commitments pursuant to grave disability. The latter criterion
may be referred to as the "dangerousness category," which is invoked by the police
power.
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 508, 723 P.2d at 1108.
115. Id. (quoting Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 842, 689 P.2d at 1371 (quoting Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743)). It is unclear whether Washington law holds these
stated interests to be exclusive or merely indicative of a requisite intensity. The
Massachusetts court has held that other state interests-such as the preservation of
institutional order and the maintenance of efficiency-may be sufficiently compelling
to deprive a patient of fundamental liberties. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers,
379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979). However, Washington courts apparently have not
recognized any compelling interests other than the four mentioned.
116. Although the court may correctly imply that the four recognized state
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the Massachusetts judicial model, a patient's refusal of anti-
psychotic drugs may be overridden only to remedy an emer-
gency situation 117 or to prevent the "immediate, substantial,
and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness,"
when there can be no delay."' Unlike the Schuoler opinion,
the Massachusetts doctrine provides well-defined requirements
for the forcible administration of intrusive treatment.
The Schuoler court did not comment on what other state
interests might be sufficiently compelling to order ECT. How-
ever, the court applied the facts of Ms. Schuoler's case to the
test provided and noted that her treating psychiatrists' testi-
mony revealed a compelling state interest. Ms. Schuoler's disa-
bilities and repeated admissions to medical facilities have"constituted a tremendous financial burden for the State."'" 9
Further, one doctor testified that without treatment, she "may
end up in the back wards of (a) state hospital, a helpless crea-
ture that nobody can ever take care of."' 2 ° The court failed to
explain how these findings give rise to any particular compel-
ling state interest.
The court did not provide an adequate description of or
limitation on the type of state interests a judge may utilize to
override a patient's refusal of treatment. This lack of precision
may lead judges to assume that state interests involving less
than emergency situations are sufficiently compelling. If such
assumptions are made, they may be corrected only on appeal,
after the damage has been done.
In addition, the court asserted in an alarming footnote that
"[a]s a practical matter, a court probably can find a compelling
state interest to treat an involuntarily committed person with
ECT relatively often."'' The court rationalized this assertion
by noting that involuntary commitment requires the state to
find that a person presents a likelihood of harm to himself or
others or is gravely disabled.'22 Thus, the court has created an
unfounded assumption that simply because a person is involun-
interests should not be inclusive, the court has not laid the floor as to what other
interests might or might not be sufficiently compelling to forcibly administer ECT.
117. Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 509, 458
N.E.2d 308, 322 (1983).
118. Id.
119. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 509, 723 P.2d at 1109.
120. Id.
121. Id at 508 n.4, 723 P.2d at 1109 n.4 (emphasis added).
122. Id.
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tarily committed, his illness will give rise to a compelling state
interest for administering ECT. This assumption may defeat
the entire process of judicial protection of the patient's right to
refuse treatment on a case by case analysis. Further, it may
negate altogether the patient's right to refuse treatment.
The court's analysis fails when viewed in light of the cur-
rent definition of grave disability.
The 1979 ITA required proof of explicitly dangerous
behavior in order to commit a person as dangerous to self or
others. In contrast, commitment for grave disability/cogni-
tive or volitional impairment, is more subjective and hence
elastic since it is phrased in diagnostic terms. Moreover, it
does not require proof of specific types of behavior. Conse-
quently, this criterion may encourage excessive judicial def-
erence to the opinions of mental health professionals,
thereby effectively insulating their commitment recommen-
dations from judicial review.... In addition, inappropriate
judicial deference to professionals' commitment recommen-
dations based on "grave disability" may also be encouraged,
since there is empirical evidence indicating that expert wit-
nesses seldom testify on behalf of patients at commitment
hearings.' 23
Thus, a gravely disabled person may still be subject to the
unquestioned expertise of mental health professionals. Given
the court's propensity to rely on MHP's, one should be dis-
turbed by the Schuoler court's assumption that a compelling
state interest to treat gravely disabled persons with ECT will
be found relatively often. The court could have avoided this
reliance on MHPs' opinions by providing better definitions of
compelling state interests and by requiring the existence of an
emergency situation, as the Massachusetts doctrine has done.'24
IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court has put some meat on the
bare section of the ITA that merely requires a judicial hearing
and authorization to administer highly intrusive psychiatric
treatment to involuntarily committed mental patients. The
court has established substantive and procedural guidelines for
judges to follow in deciding when to respect a mental patient's
123. Empirical Consequences, supra note 4, at 429-30 (footnotes omitted). See also
LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at 207, 723 P.2d at 146.
124. See supra notes 40-72 and accompanying text.
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right to refuse ECT. These guidelines are a step in the right
direction.
The Schuoler court has attempted to satisfy the competing
interests of various groups involved in the ECT decision-
making process. However, through an array of misperceptions
and inarticulate standards, the court has created a hybrid deci-
sion-making model. This resulting model purports to effectu-
ate the goals of the judicial substituted judgment model but in
reality encourages the potential for abuse found in the medical
second-opinion model.
To mitigate against the dangers of the Washington hybrid
model, the courts of this state should make proper adjust-
ments. First, courts should fully consider all factors enumer-
ated in the Ingram opinion when making a substituted
judgment for a patient. Second, courts should make a bona
fide competency determination, inquiring whether the patient
is capable of making an informed medical decision, when
deciding whether to make a substituted judgment at all.
Finally, courts should recognize that patients committed as
likely to cause serious harm to self or others, or as gravely dis-
abled because of failure to provide for their essential human
needs, will not necessarily give rise to a state interest suffi-
ciently compelling to justify the nonconsensual administration
of ECT. Without these further refinements, the consequences
of this hybrid model may be formidable.
Gregory S. Marshall
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